Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 26

Issue 1

Article 6

December 1947

Property - Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1946-1947
Chicago-Kent Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Property - Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1946-1947, 26 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 67
(1947).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol26/iss1/6

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1946-1947

mitting the exercise of jurisdiction if and when it could be acquired. 1 The net result would have been that "no decree would
ever be final on the question of alimony short of an express waiver,
a denial of alimony, or a recital of alimony or property settlement. ' '3 2 The entire series of bills did contain many desirable
features beside the one mentioned, so it is to be hoped that they
will be re-enacted after elimination of the unconstitutional features. One measure which appears to have survived grants to
the court the power to restrain any third person, party to the
suit, from doing or threatening any act calculated to obstruct a
3
reconciliation of the parties to the marriage .

VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

By far the most important contribution to the law of real
property was made by legislative action in adopting a new act
dealing with rights of entry and possibilities of reverter such as
arise after conveyance of a fee simple on condition subsequent.1
The general purpose of that statute is to provide a means by
which such rights may be released or destroyed, a purpose the
desirability of which cannot be questioned, particularly by any
practitioner who has been faced with passing upon the validity
of a title encumbered thereby. Issues will undoubtedly arise as
to the constitutionality of such statute insofar as it may be applied to deeds executed before the enactment thereof. In that
respect, reference is made to an excellent discussion on the subject
appearing elsewhere which contains so complete a treatment of
2
the entire subject that repetition would be pure superfluity.
Except for that statute, debatable legal questions growing
out of ownership of land or rights therein have been relatively
31 Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. 417; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 19.

32 See Goldblatt, "Matrimonial Law," 36 Ii1. B. J. 104 at 105. A reading of this
article is recommended.
z3 Laws 1947, p. 817, S. B. 421; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 13.
1 Laws 1947, p. 659, S. B. 347; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 37b et seq.
2 See Denissen, "The Illinois Reverter Act," 36 Ill. B. J. 263-71.
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few in number. In Bruce v. McCormick3 the court refused to
deviate from the rule that the statutory right of a' surviving
spouse to take dower in the lands of the deceased spouse 4 does
not confer any estate or title in the land itself, prior to an election
to claim such dower right,5 hence a conveyance by the surviving
spouse within the ten-month period and before election has occurred passes no interest in the land. In that case, the attempted
conveyance was made by quit-claim deed. Whether the same result
would have been achieved had a warranty deed been used is a
matter of speculation.'
An issue of some importance to holders of easements was
dealt with in Cook County v. Vander Wolf 7 wherein the public
authority sought to acquire several adjacent tracts of land for the
laying out of a state-aid highway. One of the defendants sought
an assessment of the amount of damage accruing to that portion
of the property not taken. A verdict was obtained on which the
particular defendant then sought judgment in his favor, but the
public authority contended that as there were reciprocal easements for right of way in favor of adjoining owners over the land
in question this demand should not be granted. The trial court
adopted the county's argument and ordered the judgment paid to
the county treasurer for the benefit of the owner or owners of the
land as their interests might appear. Upon appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed that decision. It did say, however, that
one "holding an easement in a strip of land as a right of way,
merely, sustains no damage in consequence of the taking of the
land for a street. When the land is taken and maintained as a
street by the public authorities the owner's easement of a way is
not impaired but still exists, as he has all the right of way before
enjoyed.''8 For that reason, the owner of the right of way was
3396 Ill. 482, 72 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RMW w
324.
* 4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 162.
5 Ibid., § 171.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 6. See also 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEow 324,
particularly pp. 327-8.

7394 Ill. 521, 69 N. E. (2d) 256 (1946). Murphy, J., dissented without opinion.
8 394 il. 521 at 526, 69 N. E. (2d) 256 at 259.
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said to have no interest in the compensation fund provided as a
substitute for the property taken.
When conveyance pursuant to contract is refused, the purchaser seeking specific performance has, for a long time, been
faced with the rule that he can be granted no more then the vendor
has to convey and, if the vendor's wife does not join in the contract or agree to release her inchoate dower right, the purchaser
cannot be given a clear title nor is he entitled to an abatement in
the price equal to the value of such dower right. 9 The argument
was advanced, in Pearson v. Adams, 10 that the provision in the
present Probate Act establishing a means for acquiring an outstanding inchoate dower interest 1 had served to change the public
policy of the state and thereby nullify a long line of decisions
against the right to compel specific performance with abatement
in price. The court, however, very properly held that a provision
dealing with involuntary sales on execution and the like could have
no application to voluntary transactions such as the one before it.
It therefore declined to change the rule in question. In another
specific performance case, that of Kozlowski v. Mussay,12 the
court was obliged to determine the size of the estate to be granted
under a contract calling for the reconveyance of land by a warranty deed to the original grantor "personally but not to her
heirs or administrators," if the original grantor should request
such reconveyance during her natural lifetime. The court decreed
that the defendants should convey the fee simple title which they
had received, rather than just a life estate, following the theory
that a grant to a named person will convey a fee in the absence
of express limitation 1 3 and the evident purpose of the restrictive
language in the contract was simply to permit the grantees to
retain the land if reconveyance bad not been requested by the
14
grantor during her lifetime.
Humphrey v. Clement, 44 Ill. 299 (1867).
777 (1946), noted in 35 Ill. B. J. 269.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 189.
12 395 Ill. 81, 69 N. E. (2d) 338 (1946).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 8.
14 Minor statutory revisions affecting real property may be found. There has
been an increase in the fees properly chargeable by the Registrar of Titles, Laws
9

10394 Ill. 391, 68 N. E. (2d)
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Two cases dealing with doctrines of personal property are
worthy of mention. One might infer that proprietors of safety
deposit vaults in Illinois have exercised unusual precautions to
protect their customers against the loss of valuables from carelessness, for the absence of reported cases in this state dealing
with the right to control any such property points in that direction. That fact alone makes the decision in Pyle v. Springfield
Marine Bank15 particularly significant for it was there held for
the first time in this state that, as between the proprietor of the
vault and the discoverer of a lost bond picked up from the floor of
a customer's booth, the right to possess the property until the
true owner could be located was in the vault proprietor. There
does not, however, appear to be any critical analysis in that case
of a possible distinction between the property which can be said
to be lost and that which has merely been mislaid, the former
going to the discoverer while the latter being awarded to the
owner of the premises upon a theory of prior possession growing
out of an implied bailment. Instead, the court placed emphasis on
the degree of control exercised over the premises in which the
discovery -took place, thereby limiting the discoverer's right to
control the property to situations where the finding occurs in a
"public" place. Since neither of the litigants was entitled to the
lost article as his own, 16 the decision might be justified on the
ground that the loser would be more apt to regain his property
if the same was left in the control of the owner of the premises
where the loss occurred.
The only recognized basis for a common-law lien on personal
property was that the lien claimant had, by his skill and labor,
enhanced the value of the property in question. Custom might,
however, expend the operative area in which a lien might be
1947, p. 655, H. B. 820, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 104 and § 105,. and the Land
Registration Act has also been amended to delete any reference to "ex-officio"
recorders serving as registrars of title: Laws 1947, p. 657, H. B. 629, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 30, §§ 45-6. Under an addition to the statute relating to transfers of
land between municipalities, it is now possible to convey to the state and for the
state to negotiate to remove any restrictions on the title: Laws 1947, p. 661, S. B. 65,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 158a.
15330 Ill. App. 1, 70 N. E. (2d) 257 (1946), noted in 35 Ill. B. J. 419.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 50, § 28.
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claimed. 1'7 It was held, in Deitchman v. Korach,18 that a salesman
working on commission would acquire no lien for his compensation on samples furnished by his employer, for he could meet
neither of the tests suggested and the contract of employment was
silent on the point, although it did stipulate that the ownership of
the samples was retained by the employer and the goods were to
be used for display purposes only.
LANDLORD AND TENANT

A perusal of the more significant cases falling within this
category would indicate that the problems respecting the nature
of the notice necessary to terminate the relationship of landlord
and tenant are not all settled. In Ziff v. Sandra Frocks, Inc.,19
for example, the problem posed was one concerning the propriety
of serving a notice by registered mail. The tenant, who admitted
receiving the notice, contended that as the notice was not served
personally it was ineffective. 20 The court held otherwise, pointing
out that the statute is not mandatory and that alternative means
of giving notice are permissible so long as they accomplish statutory objectives. 21 In Heun v. Hanson,2" the prime question was
one as to the extent of notice necessary to terminate the tenancy.
The original lease to the premises there concerned had been entered into some thirteen years prior and ran for a term of eleven
months. At the expiration thereof the tenant continued to occupy
the premises and to pay rent down to the time of bringing suit.
17 Rushforth v. Hadfield, 7 East 224, 103 Eng. Rep. 86 (1806).

18330 Ill. App. 365, 71 N. E. (2d) 367 (1947).
See also the companion case of

19 331 Ill. App. 353, 73 N. E. (2d) 327 (1947).
Sandra Frocks, Inc., v. Ziff, 397 Ill. 497, 74 N.

E.

(2d)

699

(1947)

which was a

suit by the tenant to compel specific performance of an option to convey the
leased premises. The decision thereon accords with the action taken in the case
noted.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, § 10, provides: "Any demand may be made or
notice served by delivering a written or printed ... copy thereof to the tenant.
Italics added.
21 See also Goraway v. Sheley, 331 Ill. App. 181, 72 N. E. (2d) 632 (1947), abst.
opin. Leave to appeal denied. The court in the instant case quoted from the
opinion therein by saying: "The statute does not purport to restrict the making of
a demand or the service of a notice to the particular methods stated in the
statute."
22 331 Ill. App. 82, 72 N. E. (2d) 703 (1947).
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The trial court held that because the original tenancy was for less
than one year the holdover constituted a month to month tenancy
terminable on thirty days' notice. The Appellate Court reversed
on the ground that where a lease is for a period of less than a
year but more than one month, the holding over will be construed
to create another rental period for the same length as the original
term. As a consequence notice of termination cannot be given at
any time but must be one to coincide with the expiration of the
23
rental period.
The case of Bogden v. Laswell,24 while not enunciating any
new rule of law, is also important in any discussion of notice. The
term involved therein was for five years and the premises were
to be occupied for a tavern or other business purpose under a
stipulation whereby the lessee agreed that he would not "permit
or suffer any noisy, noxious or offensive trade, business or occupation ... to be carried on in said premises." A further provision
permitted the landlord, at his election, to terminate the lease for
any default. It came to the lessor's attention during the term
that the lessee was using the premises for gambling. Thereupon
the lessor caused notice to be given by registered mail to the
effect that the lease was instantly terminated. When sued for
possession, the tenant argued that, if the right to declare a forfeiture existed, the lessor was obliged to give a ten-day notice. 25
The court, in its opinion, referred to the case of Clark v. Stevens 26
which contains an excellent discussion of the law in regard to forfeitures, both with and without notice, and declared that there was
no case in this jurisdiction which required any communication to
the tenant of the lessor's intention to forfeit. It therefore decided
that the notice given was sufficient.
Liability of a landlord growing out of the condition of the
demised premises was involved in Crawford v. Orner & Shayne.27
The problem there raised was as to whether or not it was the duty
23 Il1.
24 331
25 See
26 221
27 331

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, § 6.
Ill. App. 395, 73 N. E. (2d) 441 (1947).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, § 9.
Il1. App. 233 (1921).
Il1. App. 568, 73 N. E. (2d) 615 (1947).

Leave to appeeal has been denied.
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of a landlord to furnish window screens sufficiently strong to
support a person leaning against the same. The plaintiff was a
child of three who, on a warm day, climbed on the sill of an open
window and leaned against a fly-screen which admittedly did not
fit securely. The screen gave way, the plaintiff fell to the ground
and suffered serious injury. A judgment for the landlord was
affirmed on the theory that there was no duty imposed to maintain
a window screen which would be sufficient in strength to support
the weight of a person leaning against it, the purpose of such a
screen being merely to keep insects from entering the premises.
An interesting declaratory judgment proceeding, that of
InternationalHotel Company v. Libbey, 28 called for an interpretation of a lease under which the lessee was to pay a minimum rent
together with a percentage equal to one-third of the net earnings.
The sole question was whether the lessee, in calculating "net earnings," might deduct as "ordinary and necessary" expenses certain federal income and excess profits taxes and also sums reserved, but not expended because of the war, for additions and
betterments. The court considered the tax items as being comprehended within the term "ordinary and necessary" expenses
for the reason that the property could not be operated success'fully without the payment thereof. Such items were likened to
general property taxes, were a burden to be expected in the regular course of business, so were "ordinary," and as they had to be
paid in order that operation might continue, were clearly "necessary." Sums reserved for additions and betterments were excluded, however, as there was no absolute duty on the part of the
tenant to make such expenditure.
The possibility of a lapse in federal rent regulation impelled
the legislature to adopt a state rent control statute which provides
that whenever any community, through its corporate authorities,
shall adopt the act then local rent control shall be in force so long
as the local commission believes rent control to be necessary but
28158 F. (2d)

717 (1947).
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in no event beyond the effective termination date of the statute.
Maximum rental ceilings are provided as well as criminal penalties for violations.29
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

The concern of the chancellor in preventing a creditor from
taking an unconscionable advantage of a necessitous debtor has
been emphasized many times by declaring absolute deeds to be
nothing more than mortgages from which redemption is permissible. Much the same thought must have prompted the court, in
Dittma v. Miller,30 to reverse a decree denying to the debtor a
right to redeem from an escrow arrangement under which a certificate of sale issued pursuant to execution sale had been deposited for surrender to the debtor provided he met certain stipulated terms with respect to satisfaction of the judgment. The
arrangement was treated as nothing more than an equitable mortgage impressed with a right of redemption not destroyed by a
failure on the part of the debtor to make the prescribed payments.
The fact that the creditor would receive property worth approxi.
mately $4000 more than the amount of the balance due him if the
right to redeem was denied may have aided in the determination
of the case. 31 Statutory right to redeem from foreclosure sale, on
the other hand, is intended as a means by which junior creditors
may seek further sales of the property in order to make the mortgagor's assets satisfy as many of his debts as possible. The decision in Peterson v. Grisel132 is noteworthy for its denies junior
creditors the chance to speculate on the possibility of an enhancement in values by recognizing an absolute right on the part of the
holder of a certificate of sale, within the same time as is allotted
to the judgment debtor, to tender the amounts due to the junior
creditors and thereby defeat any statutory right of redemption
from the original sale. If delay beyond that period occurs, the
29 Laws 1947, p. 1159, H. B. 278; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, §§ 48-61. There
has also been a slight revision of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 7, with respect
to the return date on the summons issued by a justice of peace in forcible detainer
proceedings.
30 330 Ill. App. 325, 71 N. E. (2d) 186 (1947).
31 See Allen v. Allen, 242 Ill. 510, 90 N. E. 274 (1909).
32330 Ill. App. 587, 71 N. E. (2d)

832 (1947).
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certificate holder will be obliged to secure the creditor's acceptance
3
of the funds deposited.
Whatever the rule may be with respect to the discharge of a
surety by the action of the principal creditor in releasing a portion of the security without the surety's consent, the case of Massman v. Duffy 34 clearly holds that a mortgagor, personally liable
as the principal debtor, can gain no advantage from the fact that
the mortgagee has seen fit to release the lien of the mortgage as
to a portion of the premises which had been taken under eminent
domain proceedings so long as the proceeds of the condemnation
be applied toward the reduction of the indebtedness. The same
case also indicates that an action to foreclose is brought in sufficient time if the complaint is filed within the applicable limitation
period" eyen though no effort is made to serve process until after
the period has expired 6
A slight change in the statute concerning mortgages has been
made to delete the words "real estate" heretofore found in the
provision authorizing the sheriff to execute any power of sale contained in the mortgage instrument, 37 a change made clearly necessary to bring that provision into harmony with another section
forbidding foreclosure of real estate mortgages through power of
sale.A There is also evidence of further tinkering with the limitation provision respecting the lien of real estate mortgages, at
least so far as third persons may be concerned. The result has
been to make the statute in question even more complicated than
39
before.
33 See Sutherland v. Long, 273 Ill. 309, 112 N. E. 660 (1916), where the tender
was accepted, and McGowan v. Goldberg, 281 I1. 547, 117 N. E. 1045 (1917),
where it was rejected.
34330 Ill. App. 76, 69 N. E. (2d) 707 (1946).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 11.
36 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 129, states that an action shall be commenced by the "filing
of a complaint." Gage v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 303 Ill. 569, 136 N. E. 483
(1922), was distinguished on the ground that the factual situation there involved
was not comparable to the one before the court.
37 Compare Laws 1947, p. 1227, H. B. 208, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95, § 12,
with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95, § 12.
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95, § 23.
39 Laws 1947, p. 1178, S. B. 314; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § lb.
The change
would appear to be particularly important to persons holding mortgages the due
date of which, as shown by the record, is more than nineteen but less than twenty
years before the effective date of the amendment, if no extension agreement has
been recorded since the filing of the original instrument.
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TRUSTS

The recent case of Kane v. Johnson, ° wherein a surviving
joint tenant was held to be trustee of the entire property for the
benefit of the deceased joint tenant's heirs, has caused considerable local comment. When property is taken in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship, it is the habit to assume that the intent of
the parties is obvious and almost uncontradictable from the mere
form of the conveyance, but that assumption is not always wholly
warranted. Title to the property there concerned had been conveyed, for consideration, to two cousins as joint tenants. Upon
the death of one of them, the survivor claimed the whole of the
title by right of survivorship, but the husband of the deceased
joint tenant sued to have a resulting trust declared for the use
of himself and the other heirs. On the proofs submitted, it was
shown that the deceased tenant had made the down payment of
one-third of the price by cashier's check purchased from her own
individual savings account. She signed a mortgage for the balance along with the other joint tenant. Evidence as to any payments made by the survivor was neither specific nor convincing,
in fact was actually contradictory. The chancellor decreed a resulting trust and the Supreme Court affirmed. Some of the cases
cited by the court seem more compelling on the facts than does
the instant case, for there the dispute was solely between the joint
tenants or their privies, whereas in Mauricau v. Haugen,4 1 for
example, the plaintiff was a judgment creditor enjoying a much
stronger position than did the defendant. In none of the cases
cited, however, were the rights of an innocent purchaser for value
concerned. He would not be bound by the resulting trust for there
would be nothing on record to put him on notice and he should be
entitled to rely on the mere form of the deed. Where such is
not the case, the apparent and expressed intent evidenced by the
joint tenancy deed ought to give way to the rule of equity which
protects a party beneficially interested and which gives rise to a
4o397 I.

112, 73 N. E. (2d) 321 (1947), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 58.
186, 56 N. E. (2d) 367 (1944), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 35. See also Partridge v. Berliner, 325 Ill. 253, 156 N. E. 352 (1927).
41387 Ill.
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resulting trust, the instant legal title is transferred, in favor of
the one furnishing the consideration.
In two cases published in the same volume, the Supreme Court
distinguished on the facts but reiterated the power of a court of
chancery to decree a deviation from the terms of a trust when
required by necessity. In Dyer v. Paddock,4 2 the court held the
facts sufficient but in Stough v. Brach43 they were not enough to
permit deviation. In the former, the property was in danger of
loss through physical deterioration as well as by reason of a great
change in the use and value of adjoining premises. In the latter,
the trust property could have been lost through the failure of the
beneficiary to pay taxes, but there was no showing of an inability
to do so. Section 50 of the Chancery Act, 44 which restates the
historical basis for deviation, was apt and contributed to the deci45
sion in the Dyer case.
Legislation has been added enlarging the powers of trustees
under express trusts or testamentary trusts, thereafter created,
so as to permit such persons to grant options, sell at public or
private sale, or execute proxies to vote corporate shares held by
the trust.46 The statute also permits a surviving trustee to exercise all rights, titles and powers during a period of vacancy in the
trusteeship and confers similar powers on successor trustees. A
series of bills has also been enacted to regulate perpetual care
funds paid to cemeteries, the principal bill being the Cemetery
Care Act 47 designed to place such funds under the supervision of
the State Auditor.48

395 I1. 288, 70 N. E. (2d) 49 (1946), noted in 35 Ill. B. J. 417.
395 Ill. 544, 70 N. E. (2d) 585 (1947).
44 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 22, § 50.
45 See comment thereon in 35 Il. B. J. 417.
46 Laws 1947, p. 1747, H. B. 47; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 148, § 35.
47 Laws 1947, p. 338, S. B. 584; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 21, § 64.1 et seq.
48 See also Laws 1947, p. 658, S. B. 656; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 153, dealing with the accumulation of income in trust. Any trust created for the care
of burial places is now exempted from the provision against accumulations whereas
heretofore that exemption was granted only to trusts for the "perpetual" care
thereof.
42
43

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

WIILS AND ADMINISTRATION

Revision and reorganization of any substantial portion of the
statutory law may call up for redetermination questions previously regarded as well-settled. Thus, in Sternberg v. St. Louis
Union Trust Company,49 the court had before it the effect, if any,
of Sections 85 and 89 of the still relatively new Probate Act5"
upon the established rule that the validity of a will devising real
estate is to be tested by the law of the state where the real estate
is situated. The will of the testator there involved, he being a
resident of Missouri, was valid in that state but since he had married subsequent to the execution thereof the will, tested by Illinois
law, would be deemed revoked.51 In a will contest suit, filed after
the will had been admitted to probate in this state as provided in
Section 87 of the Probate Act,5 2 the court held that the will was
ineffective to pass title to real estate situated in Illinois and that
there was nothing in the statute to vary the established rule that
all questions of execution, validity, and revocation of a will devising real estate are to be resolved on the basis of the lex rei sitae.
Thus an order admitting a foreign will to probate has no greater
effect than would a similar order pertaining to a domestic will
and, upon a will contest, the validity of the will is to be determined
de novo.
Interesting on the facts, but enunciating no new rules or principles, was Hedlund v. Miner.5 3 Testator's will, executed only
twenty-two days prior to the birth of his child, made his wife sole
beneficiary and made no mention of the child. The court held
that the child was entitled, by virtue of Section 48 of the Probate
Act, 54 to take its intestate share of the testator's property. The
widow urged that testator's obvious knowledge of the imminence
of the child's birth made it clear that he intended to disinherit the
49394 Ill. 452, 68 N. E. (2d)
5o Iii. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3,
51 Ibid., § 197.
32 Ibid., § 239.
53 395 Ill.
217, 69 N. E. (2d)
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3,

892 (1946), noted in 35 Ill. B. J. 220.
§ 237 and § 241.

862 (1946).
§ 199.
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child. The court, rejecting the argument, considered testator's
failure to provide for or to mention the child as indicative of
just the opposite in the light of the presumption that testator
knew the statute would make provision for a child born after the
will was made.
Worthy of mention is certain litigation which called into question the authority of a deputy clerk of the Probate Court of Cook
County, also called an "assistant to the judge," to hear evidence
on the admission of a will to probate. The heirs and next oi kin,
in People ex rel. Kula v. O'Connell,5 5 sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the probate judge to expunge from the records all
entries regarding the hearing for admission to probate of decedent's will on the ground that the hearing of testimony by a deputy
clerk was not authorized. It was held that the application for
the writ was properly denied by the trial court since the certificate of the probate judge that testimony was taken before him
was a sufficient showing that the applicable statute5 6 had been
complied with, hence relators had not shown that the proceedings
in the probate court were void. The mandamus application was
made subsequent to the commencement of a will contest in the
same matter. 57 In that proceeding, an amendment to the complaint
sought to attack the probate proceedings on the same ground of
want of authority in the deputy clerk to hear testimony. This
amendment was held properly stricken as being inconsistent with
the purpose and prayer of the complaint, for there can be no will
contest unless there has been a valid order admitting the will to
probate. The operation of the present Probate Act is apparently,
in this respect, the same as that of the former law.
The court had occasion to express its views on undue influence
in Challiner v. Smith 58 and for the second time in the same litigation in Tidholm v. Tidholm.5 9 It is apparent that the court intends
55 394 Ill. 409, 68 N. E. (2d) 758 (1946).
56 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 221 and § 227.
57 Kula v. Sitkowski, 395 Ill. 167, 69 N. E. (2d) 688 (1946).
58 396 Ill. 106, 71 N. E. (2d) 324 (1947).
59397 Il. 363, 74 N. E. (2d) 514 (1947). See also Tidholm v. Tidholm, 391 Ill.
19,-62 N. E. (2d) 473 (1945).
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to continue to require will contestants who allege undue influence
to present clear and convincing evidence in order to prevail. The
reaffirmance of the standard laid down in Applehans v. Jurgenson,' ° followed in numerous other cases,' indicates that, as in the
past, a relatively small proportion of will contests predicated on
this ground are likely to succeed.
62
The decision of the Appellate Court in In re Abell's Estate,
noted last year, 63 has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.6 4 The
case- required construction of Section 96 of the Probate Act, dealing with preferential rights to administer an estate. 5 The court
concluded that the statute is not mandatory in character, hence
the probate court has the right to exercise a discretion when the
person who would be entitled to administer is hostile to others
interested or to the estate itself. The holding is in line with
66
decisions in other states where the statutes are similar.
No statute expressly authorizes another person to guide the
hand of a feeble testator in the execution of a will but, according
to In re Estate of Kehl,6 7 such a "guided signature" does not
invalidate the will. When it is considered that the statute does
permit testator's signature to be affixed entirely and completely
by some other person at the testator's request 68 the reasonableness of the decision can scarcely be open to question.
After a will has been denied probate, it is customary to
require that the same remain a part of the public records of the
court even though it possesses no legal effect so far as the particular jurisdiction is concerned. It may happen, however, that such
instrument could possess validity elsewhere, so a genuine prob60336 Ill. 427, 168 N. E. 327 (1929).

61 See, for example, Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N. E. (2d) 768 (1945) ; Quathamer v. Schoon, 370 Il1. 606, 19 N. E. (2d) 750 (1939) ; Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill.
135, 15 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938) ; Morecraft v. Felgenhauer, 346 I1. 415, 178 N. E.
877- (1931).
62 329 Ill. App. 73, 67 N. E. (2d) 294 (1946).
63 See 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 65.
64395 Ill. 337, 70 N. E. (2d) 252 (1946).
65 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 248.
66 See note in 45 Mich. L. Rev. 203 and cases there cited.
67 397 Il1. 251, 73 N. E. (2d) 437 (1947).
68 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 194.
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lem is likely to develop as to how it can be given operative effect
in the other jurisdiction particularly since ancillary proceedings
can hardly be based thereon. That problem was resolved, in In re
Barrie's Estate,69 by granting permission to the legatees to withdraw the original rejected instrument for the purpose of offering
it for probate in a foreign state. The authority for such an order
was said to rest upon the absence of any contradictory provision
in the Probate Act70 and the inherent power of every court to
permit the removal of original files and exhibits. 7 1
Two sections of the Probate Act were amended during the
year. Section 38 now adds real estate sales in proceedings by a
guardian or conservator under the act to the types of sales in
which the owner may bring an action to acquire an outstanding
inchoate dower interest.7 2 Section 322 was also changed so that
the conservator or guardian is no longer automatically entitled to
administer the estate of his deceased ward but must secure new
letters of administration. 73

VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMIINISTRATIVE LAW

The decision of the Supreme Court in Deutsch v. Department
of Insurance' furnishes an interesting commentary on the treatment to be accorded in a court of review upon informal administrative procedure. The applicants there concerned made due and
proper application for a license to engage in the small loan business.
The application was accompanied with an investigation fee, an annual license fee and a statutory bond, all in conformity with the
statute. 2 The Department was then required to make an investi69

331 Ill. App. 443, 73 N. E. (2d) 654 (1947).
7o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 235, requires that all wills admitted to probate
shall remain in the custody of the clerk of the court, but is silent as to the disposition to be made of a rejected will.
71 Lee v. Hicks, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 169 (1841).
72 Laws 1947, p. 1, S. B. 225; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 189.
78 Laws 1947, p. 1, S. B. 213; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 476.
-1397 I1. 218, 73 N. E. (2d) 304 (1947).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 74, § 19 et seq.

